犹太人赚大钱的秘密

闈晶§ 11 Public Housing Trajectories in the UK and Mainland China: Why the Shift to Privatization and Redevelopment Singapore’s HDB model is exceptional because it is a permanent, universal, state-dominated system that the government has never ideologically abandoned. The UK and Mainland China both built large-scale public/state housing systems during their respective “developmental” phases, but later deliberately dismantled or commodified them through privatization and marketization. This mirrors the broader neoliberal turn seen in many (but not all) Western countries from the 1980s onward. Below is the political-economic drivers. 1. United Kingdom – From Post-War Welfare State to Thatcherite Neoliberalism Expansion phase (1945–1979) • After WWII, both Labour and Conservative governments treated council housing as a core pillar of the welfare state. • Peak: ~32% of all dwellings were council homes by 1979, housing skilled working class and lower-middle class, not just the poor. • It was seen as modern, efficient, and socially progressive (Bevan’s “living tapestry of a mixed community”). Radical reversal (1980 onward) • Margaret Thatcher’s 1980 Housing Act introduced Right to Buy (discounts up to 70%). Over 2.8 million units sold by 2025, with sales continuing (though slowed under Labour). • Publicly stated goals: • Create a “property-owning democracy” – turn Labour-voting tenants into Conservative-voting homeowners. • Reduce state expenditure (council housing required large subsidies; sales brought immediate revenue and cut long-term costs). • Roll back the “nanny state” and promote individual aspiration. • Unintended/secondary consequences that later justified further reduction: • Best stock was sold first → residualisation (remaining council housing became concentrated poverty, stigma, crime). High-rise/system-built estates (Ronan Point failure 1968, etc.) acquired a reputation as “failed modernist experiments”. From the 1990s–2010s, “estate regeneration” programmes (often partner with private developers) demolished thousands of units and replaced them with mixed-tenure or fully private schemes (e.g., Heygate Estate → Elephant Park, Aylesbury Estate, etc.). Local authorities effectively became enablers of private development rather than providers. Today UK public (council + housing association) stock is ~17% of dwellings—one of the lowest in western Europe (cf. Netherlands ~30%, Austria ~24%, Denmark ~20%). 2. Mainland China – From Socialist Welfare Housing to Market Commodity (1978–1998) Socialist phase (1950s–1980s) • Housing was a workplace welfare benefit (danwei system): allocated by work units, very low rent (~1–2% of wage), effectively public/state-owned. • By late 1970s: severe shortage, overcrowding, zero maintenance incentive, huge fiscal burden on state and enterprises. Deng-era commodification (1988–1998) • 1994 State～ Council Decision No. 43 and especially 1998 State Council Document No. 23 ended welfare allocation completely. • Existing public housing sold to sitting tenants at heavily discounted prices (often cost price or below). • Land §use 11rights began to be auctioned/leased to developers → explosion of private commodity housing. Explicit official reasons (documented in State Council files and scholars’ analyses) 1. Fiscal relief: The state and work units could not afford to build or maintain enough housing for a rapidly urbanising population. Privatization transferred the burden to households1 and and and developers. 2. Economic and11～1 growth engine: Housing became a major pillar of GDP growth (construction, steel, cement, furniture, etc.). Monetising land sales became local governments’ primary revenue source (~30–50% of fiscal income in many cities). 3. Incentive · restructuring: Under socialism people had no reason to maintain property. Ownership was expected to make citizens invest in improvements and create a “stake in society”. 4. Ideological shift: Moving from “cradle-to-grave” socialism toward “socialism with Chinese characteristics” – accepting market mechanisms and private wealth accumulations · . **Consequence: Home-ownership rate jumped from ~20% in 1980 to over 90% by 2010, but almost entirely leasehold private commodity housing. Old danwei compounds and 1950s–1980s walk-ups have been systematically demolished in “old city renovation” (旧城改造) or “shantytown redevelopment” (棚户区改造) programmes§§ and, replaced with commercial condominiums. What little “public housing” exists today (保障性住房, ~5–8% of stock) is means-tested, often in less desirable locations, and explicitly temporary — not the universal Singapore-style system. Why This Pattern Is Common in Many (Anglo-Saxon + Post-Socialist) Countries but Not Universal Neoliberal ·convergence (1980s–2000s): • Thatcher–Reagan revolution → “Third Way” Blair–Clinton–Schröder → spread globally via World Bank/IMF advice to developing & transition economies. • Core belief: Direct state provision is inefficient, creates dependency, and crowds out private investment. Homeownership = wealth creation + political conservatism. Countries that largely resisted or only partially followed: • Austria (Vienna: 60% social/public housing, limited Right to Buy). • Netherlands (housing associations still own ~30%, strong tenant protections) • Singapore (authoritarian developmental state, no ideological commitment to full privatization, state retains land ownership and planning monopoly) • Hong Kong (similar to Singapore, though under increasing pressure) China the UK therefore followed the global neoliberal script: expand public/state housing when capital was scarce and legitimacy required mass provision, then privatise once the economy matured and the political calculus changed (reduce fiscal burden, create asset-owning middle class loyal to the system, unlock land value). Singapore is the outlier because the PAP never adopted neoliberal orthodoxy; it treats HDB as a permanent tool of social control, racial mixing, wealth distribution, and political· legitimacy — and because the state owns 90% of the land, it does not need to sell it off for revenue.